Nottingham Express Transit: the role of green innovation in the drive for sustainable mobility through improved public transport by Disney, J et al.
1 
 
Case Study: Nottingham Express Transit1: The Role of Green Innovation in the Drive for 
Sustainable Mobility Through Improved Public Transport 
 
John Disney, Will Rossiter and David J Smith 
Nottingham Business School, Nottingham Trent University, 50 Shakespeare Street, Nottingham  
NG1 4FQ, UK. 
Email: john.disney@ntu.ac.uk; will.rossiter@ntu.ac.uk; david.smith02@ntu.acuk; 
 
Abstract: Traffic congestion at peak times has long been a problem facing cities in the UK. 
Latterly concern about combating congestion has been hightened by concerns over carbon 
emissions and poor air quality. In tackling these problems green innovations incorporating new 
technologies appear to have much to offer, although progress in implementing these sorts of 
innovation appears to have been slow. This case study on the efforts of one city to tackle these 
problems by pioneering a number of green innovations including the introduction of a light rail 
system employing trams known as Nottingham Express Transit (NET) as well as electric and 
gas-powered buses. The nature of these innovation s is explored together with  a detailed 
examination of how they came to be implemented and the impact they have had.  
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Introduction: Traffic in Towns2 
Nottingham, with a population of 300,000 is located in a conurbation with 670,000 inhabitants 
within a 15km range. It is the seventh largest city in England and a member of the Core Cities 
group, an advocacy initiative formed in 1995 and comprising the largest regional cities in the 
UK. Located 180 km north of London, Nottingham is the largest city in the East Midlands 
region. Once very much an industrial city, its economic structure is increasingly based on 
                                                 
1 This case study draws on a local economic evaluation (Rossiter et al 2016) undertaken by a team including Will 
Rossiter, Craig Bickerton, Rick Canavan, Chris Lawton and Peter Murphy and commissioned by Tramlink 
Nottingham. 
2 ‘Traffic in Towns’ was the title of the Buchanan Report of 1963, a highly influential report on the impact of 
increased car ownership on Britain’s towns and cities (Buchanan, 2015). 
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business and financial services. Among the service organisations that are major employers in the 
city are Experian which provides business information, Capital One the financial services 
company and HM Revenue and Customs, the UK’s tax authority, whose regional offices are 
located in Nottingham. 
 
Like most cities Nottingham has a problem with the car. The city has long experienced peak 
period traffic congestion (Dale et al., 2014). Recent estimates put the cost to the local economy 
at as much as £160million per year (NCC, 2013). Consequently tackling traffic congestion has 
been an important issue for the city council for many years. This has grown in recent years as a 
result of increasing awareness of the problem of climate change and the recognition of health 
problems brought on by poor air quality caused by vehicle fumes. 
 
Urban Motorway schemes 
Back in the 1960s the city, like many large cities in England attempted to construct its way out 
the problem of traffic congestion by building more roads. Following the example of cities like 
Birmingham and Leeds that opted for major urban motorway building programmes involving the 
destruction of swathes of existing buildings, Nottingham looked to urban motorways to provide 
the capacity to cope with a rapidly increasing volume of traffic. With the construction of a 
section of inner ring road, known as ‘Maid Marian Way’, traffic was increasingly squeezed out 
of the city centre itself. This provided scope for the extensive pedestrianisation of narrow streets 
around the market place, thereby returning the central shopping and business area to people on 
foot.  
************* 
Insert Figure 1 
************* 
But Maid Marian Way was only the first small step in a much larger and much more ambitious 
scheme to create an urban motorway system around the city core. The key element in this 
scheme was a section of urban motorway called the ‘Sheriff’s Way’ (see figure 1). The plan was 
that this urban motorway would go round the eastern flank of the city centre and funnel traffic 
from the wealthy northern suburbs into a major new shopping complex, the Victoria Centre. This 
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would have involved wholesale destruction of parts of the city with a flyover going through the 
Arboretum and the historic Lace Market district intersected by a slip road. However the 
‘Sheriff’s Way’ scheme was never built. Local elections in 1972 brought a change of political 
control in the city and with it new ideas about how to tackle the problem of traffic congestion 
(Aldous, 1974). 
The Zone and Collar system 
Instead of trying to accommodate the car through road building, the city council proposed a very 
different strategy of demand management through restraining car journeys. The chosen 
instrument for achieving this was a novel ‘zone and collar system’, designed to restrict access to 
the city centre by cars at peak times. Involving the designation of special bus lanes and double 
sets of traffic lights located as part of a collar around the city centre, the system gave buses 
priority while delaying cars. This concept introduced possibly the first example of route branded 
buses in the UK (now a feature of bus operations in Nottingham and other cities throughout the 
UK), with a fleet of dedicated vehicles known locally as " Lilac Leopards" due to their colour 
and Leyland Leopard chassis. 
Introduced on an experimental basis for the peak morning period in August 1975 (Vincent and 
Layfield, 1977), unfortunately the results proved inconclusive with no significant reduction in 
traffic flows being achieved. Further analysis revealed that a factor that lay behind this was the 
very high proportion of drivers who had access to free parking in the city (Vincent and Layfield, 
1977). However over time the zone and collar experiment led to the provision of extensive park 
and ride facilities in the city and the successful introduction of more bus lanes. 
Nottingham Express Transit: Phase One 
In the late 1980s the city council, now concerned about the health of the local economy (Richer 
and Hasiak, 2014) following several major factory closures (Rossiter and Smith, 2017), as well 
as the cost of peak hour congestion, began to explore new ideas for public transport. It reached 
agreement with Nottinghamshire County Council to collaborate on a feasibility study to explore 
the best modes of transport to address the future needs of the city (Richer and Hasiak, 2014). 
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One innovation considered as part of this study was the development of a light rail system3 using 
trams as a way of relieving traffic congestion and at the same time stimulating urban renewal in 
some of the more deprived areas to the north west of the city. From an environmental point of 
view, modern trams had the advantage that they were powered by electricity rather than diesel 
and were three times more energy efficient than buses. Many European cities (and Blackpool in 
the UK) retained their original tram networks and modernised them rather than tearing up the 
tracks and replacing them with diesel buses. Trams were also perceived by many to be more 
acceptable form of transport than buses, especially for young professional people4. 
At this time the UK’s first new light rail system had just opened in London’s Docklands. While 
this was not a proper tram system in that the lines did not use roads, nonetheless it did employ 
very similar technology. Meanwhile other countries were establishing tram systems in cities in a 
bid to curb traffic congestion. France led the way in Europe, with new tram systems in Grenoble 
and Nantes (Wolmar, 2016), and trams even began to appear in the car-dominated US in cities 
like Portland and San Diego. Significantly these pioneering tram projects not only demonstrated 
that trams helped to reduce traffic congestion in cities, they also showed that large well-run tram 
networks for passengers contributed to economic development by attracting businesses in to the 
city (Forrest, 2014). Britain was slow off the mark but by the early 1990s tram schemes were 
being planned, with the first, Manchester’s Metrolink Phase 1 trams becoming operational in 
1992 (Senior, 2007). It was followed by Sheffield’s Supertram in 1994 (Mulder, 2014) and 
Croydon’s Tramlink in 2000 (Wolmar, 2016). 
The Manchester Metrolink ran from Bury some miles north of Manchester to Altrincham on the 
south side via the city centre. The route comprised a mixture of on-street lines shared with other 
traffic and converted former railway lines. The scheme quickly proved successful. By 2001 the 
trams were carrying double the number of passengers carried by the railway lines in 1987 
(Mulder, 2014). An extension to Salford was opened in 1999 and by 2006/7 the system was 
carrying 20 million passengers a year (Senior, 2009).  
                                                 
3 The term light rail was coined by the US Urban Mass Transportation Administration in 1972 to collectively 
describe a wide range of new urban public transport systems operating on on-street lines and conventional railway 
lines utilizing trams and similar vehicles (Green, 2016) 
4 The apparent reluctance of professionals to use buses may possibly be a reflection of Margret Thatcher’s reputed 
claim that, ‘a man who beyond the age of 26, finds himself on a bus may count himself a failure.’ (Economist, 2006) 
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Sheffield’s ‘Supertram’ however proved rather less successful. Use of the tram built up more 
slowly than anticipated and the hoped for impact on the local economy in terms of regeneration, 
proved disappointing (Lawless and Gore, 1999). One factor undermining the Sheffield 
Supertram was intensive competition from de-regulated bus services which undercut the tram on 
price and often provided faster door to door journey times by deviating into residential areas en 
route to the city centre. These bus operators were not interested in providing feeder services to 
tram stops as their revenue share from a through ticket would have been insufficient and they 
only tended to operate during the daytime Monday to Saturday. Another significant factor was 
that Sheffield had only recently upgraded several of the main arterial roads around the city. 
Whilst Manchester and Sheffield may have pioneered the introduction of modern tram systems 
in Britain, Nottingham was well placed to learn from these innovators. Two aspects that those 
devising a tram system for Nottingham paid attention to were the need to provide substantial 
park-and-ride parking facilities (see Table 1), to enable people to transfer from cars to trams, and 
the need to coordinate other forms of transport (i.e. buses) so that they could link up with the 
trams. Parliamentary approval for the scheme was obtained in 1994. In 1998 the Minister of 
Transport announced that government funding would be available to support the development of 
a tram system in Nottingham. The final green light for the project was given in April 2000.  
Construction of the 14km line with 24 stations began in the same year and the line opened as 
Nottingham Express Transit (NET) in March 2004 (Richer and Hasiak, 2014). NET Phase One 
stands out from other light rail systems in the UK in the extent of the park-and-ride facilities 
provided in order to encourage modal shift from cars to trams. Five large park-and-ride car parks 
offering a total of 3,000 parking spaces (Skelsey, 2007) are available. At the same time 
Nottingham City Transport (a partner in the NET consortium) and local bus operator Trent 
Barton introduced bus route revisions to act as feeders for tram operations (Skelsey, 2007).  
The new tram system quickly exceeded expectations in terms of numbers using the tram, with 
8.5 million and 9.8 million passengers carried in the first two years of operation (Potts and 
Ankrah, 2014). In addition the use of public transport in the urban area of Nottingham grew by 
8% in the five years to 2008 with road traffic only increasing by 1% compared to 4% nationally. 
The success of Phase One of Nottingham’s tram in large measure reflected the way in which the 
new system had been carefully integrated with other transport modes available in the city.  
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The original tram operating consortium included TransDev which had a minority shareholding in 
Nottingham City Transport (NCT), which was otherwise still municipally owned although 
operated as an arms length company under the requirements of the 1985 Transport Act. This 
meant that they had no desire to compete directly with the trams. Furthermore by the time that 
NET opened in 2004 the bus market had settled down in Nottingham with two high quality bus 
companies dominating the scene. For several years NCT Day and Season Tickets were also valid 
on the trams at no extra cost to passengers. 
Following the success of Phase One of the Nottingham tram project, a second phase involving 
the construction of two further lines extending the system to the south of the city was planned. 
This time however Nottingham City Council opted for a novel way of raising a very substantial 
proportion of the capital required to finance the tram extension.  
The Workplace Parking Levy 
The city council had for some time been exploring alternative ways of funding public transport 
improvements in the city. One innovative scheme considered was the introduction of a form of 
pollution tax or congestion charge known as a ‘workplace parking levy’ (WPL). This comprised 
an annual charge (i.e. tax) on each parking place occupied by an employee, student or regular 
business visitor attending their place of work. This type of scheme had first been put forward in 
1998 in a UK government White Paper ‘New Deal for Transport: Better for Everyone’, which 
proposed that local authorities be allowed to introduce road user charging (RUC) such as 
London’s ‘congestion charge’. As an alternative to road user charging the White Paper put 
forward the possibility of charges levied on workplace parking spaces. In both cases the revenue 
raised was specifically to be ring fenced for transport improvements (DTER, 1998) contained 
within a local authority’s Local Transport Plan. This proposal was duly passed into law as part of 
the Transport Act 2000.  
The purpose of a workplace parking levy was primarily as a demand management tool focusing 
on commuter parking and designed to encourage commuters to switch to alternative modes of 
transport. Similar schemes were being planned in other countries, most notably in Australia, 
where the State of Victoria was well advanced with plans for a workplace parking levy (WPL) to 
be introduced Melbourne’s central business district (Hamer et al., 2009). Introduced in January 
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2006 a charge of $AU400 was applied to all public and private parking spaces with the specific 
aim of reducing traffic congestion and encouraging the use of public transport.  
Following consultation with officials implementing workplace parking in Melbourne, the city 
council proposed introducing a similar arrangement in Nottingham. In this instance the transport 
improvement to be funded would be a major extension to the tram system. When, following local 
elections in 2009, Nottinghamshire County Council indicated that it was no longer able to 
support plans for further development of the tram system, it became clear that the introduction of 
a workplace parking levy was the only feasible means to implement a revenue raising scheme in 
time to fund the Phase Two tram extension (Dale et al., 2014). 
*********** 
Insert Table 2 
*********** 
The plan was that the workplace parking levy should contribute as much as £170 million towards 
the cost of Phase Two of the tram system. More significant was the fact that having raised money 
locally the city council was then in a position to leverage significant additional funding from 
other sources such as the UK government (see table 2). When the idea of a WPL was first 
proposed there was fierce local opposition, especially from the business community (Pidd, 
2010). There were claims that it would have an adverse effect on the local economy, forcing 
firms to leave the city because of the additional costs they would have to bear.  
When the workplace parking levy came into force in 2012 firms employing more than 11 
employees had to pay £334 per year for every parking space provided. Notwithstanding strong 
reservations voiced by local business leaders the scheme functioned remarkably smoothly. There 
were no legal challenges and 100% compliance.  In the first five years of operation the 
workplace parking levy raised £44 million in revenue all of which was hypothecated for 
improvements in public transport. Along with Phase Two of the tram, this included a number of 
other improvements to public transport in the city (see table 2), including the introduction of a 
fleet of Link Buses serving key employment sites, hospitals and park-and-ride sites and the 
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refurbishment of Nottingham’s train station. Far from an exit of firms from the city as some had 
predicted, there has been a movement of firms into the city creating nearly 2000 jobs.  
 
It is unfortunate however that the environmental gains from these public transport improvements 
will to some extent be offset by the UK Government’s recent decision to cancel electrification of 
the Midland Main Line (Topham, 2017), resulting in diesel powered trains continuing to operate 
from Nottingham train station for the foreseeable future. It is also notable that one of the major 
bus operators in Nottingham (although it operated the first small fleet of electric buses) appears 
wedded to the diesel engine, possibly because many of its routes are long with vehicles often 
clocking up in excess of 500km per day. 
 
Nottingham Express Transit Phase Two 
The NET Phase Two project extended Nottingham’s existing tram network by 17.5km and 28 
new tram stops, more than doubling the size of the network. The original estimate for the value 
of the 22.5 year Public Finance Initiative contract to design, build, operate and maintain the 
extended NET system was £570 million5, making it one of the largest construction projects 
undertaken within Nottingham in recent years.  
************ 
Insert Figure 2 
************ 
Phase Two involved extending the tram system south from the train station through the 
construction of two new arms, one going to Toton located near to junction 25 of the M1 and 
another going south of the River Trent to Clifton (see figure 2). In extending the network south 
of the city, Phase Two connected major employment sites such as the NG2 business park, the 
University of Nottingham and the Queens Medical Centre to the tram. 
                                                 
5 This figure was reduced by 15% by the then Coalition Government at the final approval stage. 
9 
 
The purpose of Phase One had been not only to reduce traffic congestion, but to stimulate 
regeneration in areas to the north of the city centre experiencing high unemployment and ones on 
the edge of the conurbation affected by pit closures. Phase Two in contrast shared the objective 
of reducing traffic congestion, but added more objectives relating to network integration and 
economic growth – factors reflected in the choice of routes. 
As an engineering challenge, the two phases of tram development were quite different. Phase 1 
was able to take advantage a number of current/former railway routes through the conurbation – 
reducing the proportion of the total route that had to be shared with other forms of road transport. 
In contrast, Phase Two saw a greater proportion of the route sharing tarmac with other road 
users. It also required the construction of five major engineering structures to effect crossings of 
the Midland Mainline railway, the River Trent and major road transport arteries within the City. 
The topography of the line coupled with the need to effect multi-modal interchange at 
Nottingham train station resulted in a significantly more complex engineering project. 
Overall, Phase Two was more integrated with larger sections of the existing urban fabric than 
Phase One. This led to significantly greater impacts on local communities during construction 
and increased associated mitigation requirements. The need to integrate with highways and other 
public infrastructure (including utilities) presented particular challenges. One indicator of the 
greater complexity faced in terms of integrating the new lines into the existing urban landscape 
was that Phase Two required approximately 80 properties to be demolished and 500 plots of land 
to be compulsorily purchased, while no properties were demolished in order to facilitate the 
construction of Phase One. This was largely a function of the use that the route was able to make 
of existing rail corridors. 
Work to pave the way for the construction of Phase Two commenced in 2000 before Phase One 
even opened, with the commissioning of a feasibility study into potential options for the further 
extension of the network. This study considered six routes in three transport corridors: Clifton, 
Beeston and West Bridgford. Its conclusions, published in 2002, were that additional routes to 
Clifton via Wilford and Chilwell via QMC and Beeston were viable in these terms, but that the 
West Bridgford option was not. The opening of Phase One in 2004 coincided with the start of 
work to prepare a Business Case for new lines for submission to Government. It is noteworthy 
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that by this time the national policy enthusiasm for light rail had cooled somewhat – largely in 
face of growing concern at the cost of such schemes. Proposed schemes in Liverpool and Leeds 
had failed to secure Government support on these grounds. A 2004 report by the National Audit 
Office (NAO)6 responded to this concern by reviewing a number of constructed tramlines, 
including Phase One of the Nottingham tram, and made recommendations intended to inform the 
manner in which future light rail projects were brought forward. 
An outline Business Case for Phase Two was developed by the then joint promoters of the 
scheme – Nottingham City Council and Nottinghamshire County Council. Programme Entry 
Approval (which was the first of three approval stages) was duly received from Government in 
2006. It seems likely that the experience of delivering Phase One, which by this point had been 
running for two years, contributed to this successful outcome for the promoters. The NET 
System Order, providing statutory powers for the scheme, was made in 2009. The preferred 
bidder was selected in March 2011 and the contract awarded to a new consortium, Tramlink 
Nottingham, in December 2011 following the receipt of Full Approval from the Department of 
Transport. 
Awarding the contract to a new consortium however presented a potential problem in terms of 
ticketing systems since the new consortium no longer included Nottingham City Transport 
(NCT)  and TransDev but did include Wellglade, the parent company of Nottingham's second 
large bus operator TrentBarton. This could have been a portent of disintegrated ticketing and 
tram/bus competition but for the swift action of Nottingham City Council to convert its paper 
based Kangaroo multiple operator ticket into the Robin Hood Smartcard. This is effectively a 
Nottingham version of the London Oystercard.and it proved very successful in encouraging 
greater use of public transport of all forms in the city, when Phase Two of the tram system 
became fully operational in August 2015. 
 
Impact of the Tram development on travel in the City 
                                                 
6 National Audit Office (2004) 
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In more than doubling the size of the existing tram system, with Phase Two the tram took on a 
more network-like form (Rossiter, 2016) capable of feeding traffic from one line into other lines, 
very much as the opening of the Victoria underground line in the late 1960s acted as a conduit 
feeding traffic into other underground lines in London (Barker and Button, 1975), resulting in 
more passengers using the system overall. 
In terms of its impact on traffic congestion in Nottingham it is as yet too early to see a clear 
picture emerging.  However table 2 shows that in 2015-16 following the opening of Phase Two 
of NET, passenger journeys on the extended tram network, increased by 50 per cent while 
vehicle miles travelled more than doubled. In the first full year of operation (April 2016-March 
2017) the enlarged tram network carried almost 16.5 million passengers (Pritchard, 2017), 4 
million more than in 2015/16 (see table 2). While this is still some way behind Manchester’s 
Metrolink which carried over 30 million passengers in 2015/16 (see table 2), the latter now has a 
significantly larger network that has been running for longer.  
*********** 
Insert Table 2 
*********** 
 
 
In terms of a modal shift from private to public transport taking place as a result of the growth of 
passenger numbers on the tram system, more modest growth in car use is evident  in Nottingham 
compared to other cities in England over the last ten years (see table 3). Clearly only a small 
amount of this can be attributed to the opening of Phase Two, which does appear to have made a 
modest contribution to date.  Over the twenty years to 2016, traffic levels in Nottingham 
increased by 4.1%, compared to a 6.4% increase in the previous ten years (see table 3). The 
figure for 1996-2016 was a substantially lower increase than occured in other cities in the East 
Midlands region. In Derby and Leicester for instance traffic growth over this period was 10.4% 
and 11.6% respectively. Other core cities in England saw similar increases in levels of traffic, 
with traffic growth in Sheffield and Leeds amounting to 12.6% and 20.8% (see table 3) over this 
period.  
12 
 
 
In terms of car miles covered within the city, the figures were if anything even more striking. 
Over the 15 years from 2000, annual car miles in Nottingham fell by nearly 40 million to 440 
million. In Bristol in contrast numbers rose by 27 million (Nottingham Post, 2016). At the same 
time public transport use in the city increased above 40 %, a very high percentage for the UK 
(Nottingham Post, 2016). 
*********** 
Insert Table 3 
*********** 
 
 
The Nottingham Tram in spatial and strategic context 
A consistent policy insight to emerge from research that has been undertaken on light rail 
concerns the importance of integrated transport and land-use planning (see for example Knowles 
and Ferbrache 2014). Some suggest that this can only occur when schemes are developed under 
the auspices of a single authority that is responsible for both transport and land-use planning 
(Dickens 1992). 
 
In this context, it is striking to note that the NET Phase Two project has been developed under 
the auspices of a single project promoter – Nottingham City Council (since the withdrawal of 
Nottinghamshire County Council in the early stages of the project). This may have served to 
facilitate better integration of transport and land-use planning than is possible in areas where 
multiple authorities are involved. It is notable that in the case of Sheffield, a failure to fully 
integrate transport and land use planning is thought to have adversely affected the ability of this 
scheme to maximise economic development and regeneration benefits (Lawless and  Gore,  
1999; Dabinett, Gore, Haywood and Lawless 1999). 
 
A striking characteristic of the NET is the degree to which it now integrates with other transport 
infrastructure. Transport integration was a key strategic objective for the extended network. 
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Indeed, both the Business Case documents prepared for NET Phase One and Two make this 
objective very explicit. Similarly, the Nottingham Local Transport Plan 2011-26 is equally 
explicit in positioning the NET at the heart of its vision for the creation of an integrated local 
transport network. While the implementation of this vision for an integrated network remains 
work in progress, the development of the NET evidences progress towards this goal. 
 
The redeveloped Nottingham train station now forms the hub from which the NET lines radiate 
to the north, west and south. The station serves the function of a multimodal interchange 
facilitating integration between light and heavy rail networks. The siting of the new Clifton park 
and ride facility integrates well with the newly dualled A453 trunk road connecting Nottingham 
to the M1 motorway. The Toton Lane park and ride site fulfils a similar function for approaches 
to the city from the west. Alongside the pre-existing Line One facilities at Hucknall and Phoenix 
Park, NET Phase Two has effectively transformed the NET from a couple of lines arrowing out 
of the City to the north (see figure 2), into a functioning and integrated network. 
 
Rossiter et al (2016) highlight the extent to which NET Phase Two has become more of a 
‘network’ with the advent of the new lines to Toton Lane and Clifton. Furthermore, the first of 
these two lines has created the potential for an important link to the planned East Midlands hub 
for the high speed rail line HS2 at Toton. As such, NET Phase Two seems likely to have paved 
the way for future transport integration as and when the planned high speed rail network 
emerges. The choice of routes – serving major strategic  employment sites in the City – further 
reinforces the impression that the NET has been integrated into local spatial planning such that it 
can support the development of key  sites within the city. 
 
The strategic integration theme is also evident  in other spheres of local decision making.such as 
the location of recent major public sector capital projects implemented by the City Council itself 
and other local anchor institutions. The City Council’s Loxley House offices are adjacent to 
Nottingham train station at the heart of the NET system. Similarly, three out of the four joint 
service centres built by the local NHS in collaboration with the City Council: Clifton 
Cornerstone (Clifton), Mary Potter Centre (Hyson Green) and Riverside Centre (Bulwell), are all 
located close to the network. Recent developments by Nottingham Trent University, both 
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teaching and residential, have consolidated the existing City and Clifton campuses, and a new 
fire station on London Road is close to both the train station and the tram/train interchange. 
 
Conclusion: Achieving Modal Shift 
Nottingham was one of the first cities in the UK to seek to bring about a modal shift from cars to 
public transport in an attempt to combat the problem of traffic congestion and latterly carbon 
emissions and poor air quality. The means to do this have over the years included a range of 
environmental or green innovations. These innovations have been both technological and 
behavioural in nature.  
 
By far the biggest technological innovation in terms of investment has been the new tram system, 
which has been developed to the point where 30% of the population of Greater Nottingham now 
live within 800 metres of  a tram stop, the only  urban area in the UK where this is the case 
(Green, 2016). Nottingham has also pioneered alternative fuelled buses, with fleets of electric 
and hybrid buses (including the first Chinese built BYD electric buses in the UK) and more than 
fifty gas powered buses. The most significant innovation in behavioural terms has been the 
introduction of a novel form of congestion charge in the form of the WPL, designed to both 
manage the demand for road space and fund improvements in public transport. 
 
A number of factors help to explain the success of Nottingham’s pioneering green innovations. 
Foremost among these factors would appear to be the way in which the tram project has been 
developed under the auspices of a single project promoter – Nottingham City Council (latterly at 
least with the withdrawal of Nottinghamshire County Council from NET Phase Two). This 
facilitated careful preparation and management as well as providing clarity in relations with 
partner organisations. As a result NET became the only tram in the UK to be described as, ‘an 
instant success’ (Green, 2016: 238). Whilst other tram schemes only gradually started to carry 
the passenger volumes anticipated, Nottingham’s tram exceeded the most optimistic predictions 
from the start, providing 90 million passenger journeys in its first decade of operations (Green, 
2016). Although  the construction of Phase Two did lead to delays it also saw the successful 
introduction of the WPL, a novel innovation in terms  of funding transport improvements and  
curbing car use, that as yet no other local authority has been bold enough to adopt.  
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Having a single promoter was linked to another key factor in Nottingham’s success, namely the 
integration of other public transport developments in the city into the tram system. From its 
inception transport integration was a key strategic objective of the tram system. The continued 
municipal stakeholding in Nottingham City Transport and the inclusion of the other major bus 
operator in the current Tram Consortium has strengthened the aims of integrated transport rather 
than the destructive deregulated bus competition which has plagued many other cities. 
*********** 
Insert Table 4 
*********** 
Notable examples of transport developments that have been integrated with the tram include the 
provision of very extensive park-and–ride facilities along the tram routes which currently have 
the capacity to take in excess of 5,000 cars (see table 4), the provision of bus services that act as 
feeders into the tram system, the provision of effective information systems giving users accurate 
information about tram availability, and the development  of  a smartcard that provides for inter-
modal and inter-operator travel on other forms of public transport (Skelsey, 2015). Similarly the 
redeveloped Nottingham train station now forms a hub from which the NET lines radiate to the 
north, west and south.  
 
With the coming of the Leeds branch of HS2, the tram’s Toton line has the potential for an 
important link to the planned East Midlands Hub station on the site of the former railway 
marshalling yard at Toton. As such, NET Phase Two has paved the way for future transport 
integration as and when the planned high speed rail network emerges.  
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Teaching Note 
 
1. Case summary 
The case study provides several examples of green innovations in the form of new 
technologies applied to public transport. While trams are clearly the main focus of the 
case study these innovations extend to electric and gas-powered buses and facilities for 
walking and cycling.  In environmental terms these green technologies not only help in 
tackling problems associated with traffic congestion such as carbon emissions, they also 
offer much scope for achieving significant improvements in air quality. Modern tram 
systems are quiet, highly efficient, and contribute to reducing carbon emissions. Similarly 
electric and gas powered buses are more environmentally friendly than their diesel 
powered equivalents 
 
The case study shows that where urban transport systems are concerned there are a range 
of green technologies available.  
 
The case study indicates that while there are a range of green technologies/innovations 
available to contribute to reducing carbon emissions, they won’t necessarily fulfil their 
potential. Achieving the outcomes that are possible is dependent on a number of factors. 
These include:- 
• The use of an integrated approach that links other facilities (e.g. car parks, 
information systems, ticketing etc) to major transport investments 
• Appreciation of the potential value of road user charging ( e.g. workplace parking 
levy) and its role in managing demand and funding the supply of appropriate 
investments 
• The need for effective inter-agency collaboration 
• Appreciation of the lengthy timescales associated with major development 
projects like trams 
It is worth noting that while the main focus of the case study is on public transport, it also 
covers important issues such as the preservation of historical and cultural aspects of 
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cities, the economic development of cities, place leadership and economic opportunities 
for different social groups. 
 
2. Case study themes and issues 
The case study focuses specifically upon innovation, in particular innovations that ofer 
environmental benefits. A number of themes can be explored through the case study 
including:- 
• The different drivers behind green innovations such as regulatory push v. 
technology push factors 
• The various technologies contributing to green innovations 
• The problems associated with trying to bring about a modal shift away from 
private cars and to public transport 
• The value of  transport networks 
• Funding public transport improvements 
• The role of transport policy 
 
3. Discussion questions 
(i.) Why was Nottingham’s ‘zone and collar’ experiment in traffic demand 
management in the 1970s not successful? Despite the apparent lack of success, 
what useful lessons if any did it provide? 
(ii.) What do you consider to be the main factors that led to a successful outcome for 
Nottingham’s innovative tram system? Why does the Sheffield Supertram appear 
to have been less successful?  
(iii.) Compare and contrast the relative merits of road user charging (like London’s 
congestion charge) and workplace parking levies (such as that introduced in 
Nottingham) as (a.) demand management mechanisms designed to curb car use 
and (b.) sources of funding for public transport improvements. 
(iv.) Given that Nottingham is the only city in Britain to have introduced a workplace 
parking levy, what do you consider were the key factors that enabled Nottingham 
to win public acceptance for this controversial form of congestion charge? 
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(v.) What part do you think Nottingham’s smartcard and information systems played 
in the success of its tram system and why? 
(vi.) When it comes to the successful adoption of green innovations – what do you 
consider to be the most important lessons that Nottingham’s innovative tram 
system offers? 
 
4. Suggested teaching approach and strategy  
This case study is mainly intended for students studying innovation, but could be used for 
other subjects as well including public management and project management. It can be 
used in a variety of different ways including: 
• As an introduction to ‘green’ aspects of innovation 
• As an illustration of some of the real life issues and problems associated with 
trying to curb traffic congestion in cities 
• As an example of the issues surrounding the practical application of green 
technologies  
• As an illustration of some of the behavioural issues associated with achieving a 
modal shift from private to public transport 
 
5. Model answers 
(i.) Why do think Nottingham’s ‘zone and collar’ experiment in the 1970s was not 
successful? Despite this what useful lessons if any did it provide? 
Nottingham’s zone and collar system was a form of demand management 
operating at peak commuting times. It was designed to curb commuting by car, 
while at the same time providing an alternative in the form of improved bus 
services and dedicated park and ride facilities.  
 
At the time there was a lot of parking both on-street and off-street available within 
the city centre of Nottingham. Comparatively little pedestrianisation had taken 
place so cars had access to streets throughout the city centre. As a result there was 
insufficient incentive for commuters to get out of their cars and use the park and 
ride buses.  
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Despite this, the zone and collar experiment did provide some very valuable 
lessons. Not least it showed the potential value of dedicated bus lanes and the 
provision of park and ride facilities (both something of an innovation at the time). 
These facilities were significantly extended and expanded in the years that 
followed. Other cities in England soon followed Nottingham’s lead. As  a result 
the park and ride concept is now much more familiar and  more widely used by 
commuters. This proved to be a key factor in the success of Nottingham’s tram 
system which from the outset provided extensive park and ride facilities at key 
locations on the tram network.  
 
The zone and collar experiment also highlighted the ‘problem’ of too much 
parking being available within the city. In the years that followed Nottingham’s 
city centre was extensively pedestrianized, substantially reducing the amount of 
on-street parking available. It also provided a strong rationale for the introduction 
of the workplace parking levy (WPL) in 2012. 
 
(ii.) What do you consider to be the main factors that led to a successful outcome for 
Nottingham’s innovative tram system? Why does the Sheffield Supertram appear 
to have been less successful?  
A number of factors resulted in a successful outcome to the innovation. These 
included: provision of large free park and ride car parks; bus services linked to the 
tram to act as feeders; a smartcard that was interchangeable with buses; and an 
information system showing tram availability.  
 
Another factor was that Phase One made extensive use of existing railway track 
which considerably eased construction. Also the route of the tram in Phase One 
linked a number of disadvantaged communities on the edge of the city (e.g. 
Hyson Green and Bulwell), giving residents access to increased job opportunities 
(i.e. the tram route both improved public transport and contributed to economic 
development/urban regeneration). 
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The construction of the Sheffield Supertram in contrast coincided with several 
major road improvement projects in the city – this reduced the incentive for car 
drivers to undertake a modal shift. Also there were separate agencies responsible 
for the development of the Supertram system and economic development in the 
city resulting in a lack of coordination. 
 
(iii.) Compare and contrast the relative merits of road user charging (like London’s 
congestion charge) and workplace parking levies (such as that introduced in 
Nottingham) as (a.) demand management mechanisms designed to curb car use 
and (b.) sources of funding for public transport improvements. 
Road Use Charging (RUC) 
Has the advantage that a widely publicised precedent has been set in London in 
the form of the congestion charge. Likely to be complex to administer with a need 
to increase charges over time, differential rates for different users etc. Collection 
costs are also likely to be expensive (i.e. cameras, recording equipment etc) 
 
Workplace Parking Levy (WPL) 
A highly contentious alternative! This has been explored by other cities in 
England but they have all balked at implementing a WPL. Nottingham is very 
much the innovator. Having implemented a WPL scheme it has the following 
advantages: Very simple and easily understood; produces a predictable income; 
few avoidance/non-compliance problems; cheap to administer. 
 
A key feature of both schemes is hypothecation. While both can deter car use the 
fact that income goes specifically to public transport improvements provides a 
strong rationale for the imposition of what is effectively a congestion tax. 
 
(iv.) Given that Nottingham is the only city in Britain to have introduced a workplace 
parking levy, what do you consider were the key factors that enable Nottingham 
to win public acceptance for this controversial form of congestion charge? 
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A highly controversial scheme! There was very strong opposition from local 
business interests prior to its introduction. Success factors include: money raised 
allocated to highly visible public transport improvements i.e. tram, buses, train 
station etc. Hence there is clear evidence of where the money is going in terms of 
public transport improvements. Nottingham has one of the newest bus fleets and 
operates efficient and well used bus services. Residents have also benefited from 
the introduction of a very effective and versatile smartcard that can be used 
interchangeably on different forms of public transport. Nottingham has also been 
a leader in introducing green innovations such as its electric and gas-powered bus 
fleets. 
 
Quite literally the evidence of where the money from WPL has gone is on the 
streets – in the form of modern and up to date forms of public transport. 
 
(v.) What part do you think Nottingham’s smartcard and information systems played 
in the success of its tram system and why? 
These may seem like minor features of the tram system, but they have actually 
been very important. Both impact directly on consumers and how they interact 
with and experience the tram system. From a consumers point of view they aid 
and assist ‘usability’. Quite literally they help to make the tram system easy to 
use.  
 
It is worth stressing that green innovations like the tram which are obvious 
symbols of technological solutions to the problems of traffic congestion/pollution, 
while they appear to have much to offer are in practice reliant on effective and 
easily usable ticketing and information solutions, if they are to bring about a 
modal shift away from cars. 
 
(vi.) When it comes to the successful introduction of green innovations – what 
important lessons does Nottingham’s innovative tram system offer? 
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A number of points emerge including: (a.) the value of having a single promoter 
(i.e..Nottingham City Council) who has been there throughout; (b.) careful 
planning and thought given to the routes – i.e. serving a number of purposes in 
addition to trying to reduce traffic congestion at peak times (for example - 
regeneration, access to the city, linking and accessing important sites/facilities in 
the city; (c.) planning the system as a network so that different routes feed-in 
passengers to the tram; (d) having access to a novel form of finance in the form of 
the WPL; (e) linking the development to other improvements in public transport 
e.g. new environmentally friendly buses. 
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Figure 1 
Nottingham’s Proposed Urban Motorway of the 1960s 
 
 
 
Source: Little (1966) 
  
27 
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Figure 2 
Nottingham Express Transit network 
 
 
Source: Nottingham City Council (2013) 
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Table 1 
 
Distribution of WPL revenue 
Public Transport 
development 
WPL 
contribution 
£m 
External 
funds 
£m 
Tram extension (Phase 2) 199.0 371.0 
Train station refurbishment 12.0 48.0 
Electric buses 5.8 9.2 
Bus station 1.7 1.3 
Smartcard system 1.1 1.0 
Information system 1.2 1.0 
Total 220.8 431.5 
Source: Nottingham City Council 
 
Table 2 
Light Rail/Tram statistics: England 2015/16 
 
Tram system Passenger 
journeys 
(m.) 
% 
change 
Vehicle 
miles 
% 
change 
Passenger 
revenue 
% 
change 
England 252.0 5.8 21.0 14.2 336.9 9.3 
London systems 143.9 2.1 5.7 2.4 184.7 9.6 
Docklands Light Railway 116.9 6.1 3.8 3.7 161.9 12.3 
Croydon Tramlink 27.0 -12.1 2.0 0.0 22.8 -6.7 
England outside London 108.1 11.0 15.3 19.4 152.2 9.0 
Nottingham Express Transit 12.2 50.2 1.6 102.1 13.6 54.9 
Midland Metro 4.8 10.4 1.0 6.1 8.6 11.9 
Sheffield Supertram 11.6 0.6 1.4 3.0 11.4 -10.2 
Tyne & Wear Metro 40.3 5.7 3.5 -0.5 50.2 4.5 
Manchester Metrolink 34.3 10.1 7.2 27.1 62.4 9.7 
Blackpool Tramway 4.9 20.3 0.6 10.3 6.1 8.6 
 
 
Source: Department of Transport 
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Table 3 
Changes in Traffic Levels 1996-2016 
 1996-2006 1996-2016 
England +13.6% +18.6% 
Nottingham City +6.4% +4.1% 
Nottinghamshire County +19.9% +27.5% 
Derby +5.1% +10.4% 
Leicester +8.7% +11.6% 
Sheffield +11.9% +12.6% 
Manchester +5.9% +5.3% 
Croydon -4.4% -11.4% 
Birmingham +3.0% +3.6% 
Leeds +13.0% +20.8 
Source: Nottingham City Council 
 
Table 4 
Park-and-Ride car park capacity for the Nottingham tram system 
 
Park-and-Ride 
site 
Capacity 
(parking 
spaces) 
Tram line Phase Time to city 
centre 
(mins.) 
Clifton 1000 Clifton 2 20 
Forest 972 Hucknall 1 7 
Hucknall 439 Hucknall 1 26 
Moor Bridge 119 Hucknall 1 13 
Phoenix Park 657 Hucknall 1 20 
Toton Lane 1400 Toton 2 28 
Wilkinson Street 600 Hucknall 1 13 
Total 5187    
 
Source: Nottingham Express Transit 
 
 
